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The UK Government has endorsed the case for autonomous vehicle (AV) technology and its
economic benefits in its industrial strategies since 2013. In late 2016 the Science and
Technology Committee in the House of Lords (the legislature’s upper chamber) conducted an
Inquiry into the policy. We conduct a content analysis of the text corpus of the Inquiry.
Drawing from theories of sociotechnical change we explore how it contributes to building a
vision of a future AV world embedded in a national economic and technological project. The
technology is framed as a solution to societal grand challenges and the Inquiry corpus is
dominated by actors committed to the project. Alternative visions, including sceptical
interpretations, are present in the corpus, but rare, reflecting the selection process for
contributions to the Inquiry. Predominantly, the corpus represents the public as deficient:
dangerous drivers, unaware of promised benefits and unduly anxious about the unfamiliar.
Their views are marginal in this Parliamentary Inquiry’s findings. AV technology is one of
several possible means to pursue wider mobility policy goals of greater safety, affordability,
access and sustainability. Our analysis suggests that the pursuit of an AV future risks
becoming a goal in itself instead of a means to these broader societal goals.
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Introducing new technologies such as autonomous vehicles(AVs)1 has social impact and since the 1990s there have beengrowing calls for innovation to be democratised within the
field of science and technology studies (Ely et al., 2014; Stilgoe
et al., 2014). Yet despite public doubts (e.g. European
Commission, 2015, 2020; Tennant et al., 2019) governments have
expressed strong commitment to roll out AV technology and
hailed its transformative potential (e.g. Centre for Connected and
Autonomous Vehicles, 2016; U.S. Department of Transportation,
2016). The empirical work of this paper examines one particular
step within the development of AV technology in the UK by
analysing the UK House of Lords Science and Technology
Committee’s Inquiry into AVs, for which hearings were held
during November 2016. We draw upon theories of sociotechnical
change and ask how the different participants in the inquiry, and
the inquiry process itself, contribute to building a vision of an AV
future.
The UK Government stated its intention to pave the way for
driverless cars in its ‘National Infrastructure Plan 2013’ (HM
Treasury, 2013), initiating a process of consultation and planning;
results were announced in February 2015. The Government’s
accompanying press release was headlined ‘UK to lead develop-
ment of driverless car technology’ and announced a ‘green light’
for testing of driverless technology on UK Roads (Department for
Business Skills and Innovation, and Department for Transport,
2015). A code of practice followed for testing AVs (Department
for Transport, 2015a) and by late 2017 the technology had
become a keen plank of the mobility strategy that comprised the
response to one of four ‘grand challenges’ within the Govern-
ment’s overall industrial strategy and modernising vision (HM
Government, 2017). To support developments the UK govern-
ment sponsored prototypes and trials through a dedicated unit,
the Centre for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CCAV).
Governments in other countries have progressed similar plans to
enable the technology (Hottentot et al., 2015).
The presumed benefits of the technology include improved
safety; reduced congestion and faster journeys; widened mobility
access and efficiency gains, such as improved distribution logistics
(all from Centre for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles, 2016,
p. 5), as well as reduced pollution (coupled with vehicle elec-
trification, HM Government, 2017, p. 48); reallocation of driving
time to other activities (Department for Transport and Jones,
2016); and finally, industrial opportunities for the UK (HM
Government, 2017, p. 49).
Similar benefits are claimed in US Government documents
(e.g. U.S. Department of Transportation, 2016, 2017). These
perceived opportunities are used to justify government resolve to
facilitate the introduction of AVs to the road. In the UK, Hopkins
and Schwanen (2018) have documented the extent to which such
Government determination generates an aura of inevitability
around the technology. Innovators and governments assert that
this inevitability justifies hastening the technology’s advent (e.g.
McGoogan, 2016). The inevitability makes it pointless to resist;
the safety case makes it immoral (Sparrow and Howard, 2017).
Imagining the future
Over the last ten years there have been repeated claims that
mobility will be revolutionised by driverless technology, with far
reaching societal transformations (Burns and Shulgan, 2018; The
Economist, 2016, 2018). This continues a tradition of futuristic
visioning of vehicle transportation well exemplified by General
Motor’s Futurama exhibition at the 1939 New York World Fair.
Building technologies of the future requires a vision or blueprint
of that future first. This paper uses a case study to consider
whether and how such a vision is being built in the UK.
Scholars have begun to document how the developers of AV
technology, and governments supportive of its deployment, are
building such visions. For example, Graf and Sonnberger (2019)
conducted a qualitative content analysis of 22 position papers
from German stakeholders on AV technology: they focused their
analysis on the role of users in future visions of autonomous
driving, or in what Jasanoff and Kim (2009) term the socio-
technical imaginary. Haugland and Skjølsvold (2020) conducted a
content analysis of consultation responses to draft legislation in
Norway together with a case study of a pilot deployment, high-
lighting, inter alia, how public consultation and public pilot
testing encourage expectations of the possible benefits of the new
technology. Mladenovic et al. (2020) conducted an analysis of
policy documents in three different countries: Finland, the UK
and Germany. They applied a theory-based analytical framework
drawing on the concepts of sociotechnical imaginaries and gov-
ernance cultures to reveal similarities and differences between the
visions being developed in each country. They too considered
how these visions positioned the public as users rather than
citizens. Manderscheid (2018) analysed videos and promotional
material associated with two visions of automobility offered by
Google and Mercedes-Benz, applying Akrich’s (1992) concept of
sociotechnical scripts to explore representations of users who are
no longer drivers within visions of a future still targeting eco-
nomic growth and increased automobility.
Among the various theoretical concepts that are deployed to
capture visions of AV futures, Braun and Randell (2020, p. 1)
argue for the utility of the theory of sociotechnical imaginaries,
stating:
‘The visions surrounding “self-driving” or “autonomous”
vehicles are an exemplary instance of a sociotechnical
imaginary: visions of a future technology that has yet to be
developed or is in the process of development.’
Jasanoff and Kim (2009, p. 120) originally defined socio-
technical imaginaries as
‘collectively imagined forms of social life and social order
reflected in the design and fulfilment of nation-specific
scientific and/or technological projects.’
A key feature of this definition is that imaginaries are built
around nation-specific projects, and three of the four studies
mentioned above locate the visions they analyse in national
contexts. In the UK, AVs were positioned as part of the ‘Future of
Mobility’ Grand Challenge (HM Government, 2017). In so doing,
the UK Government follows a trend towards framing the rela-
tionship between technology and society as one of meeting
societal challenges (Kaldewey, 2018) and seeks to legitimise the
technology as a societal project, mobilising heterogeneous actors
to meet the challenge (Kuhlmann and Rip, 2018). Framing
technologies as responses to Grand Challenges rhetorically
establishes a vision for the imagined future (Flink and Kaldewey,
2018), realising Jasanoff’s (2015, p. 19) further definition of
imaginaries as ‘collectively held and performed visions of desir-
able futures’. Shared beliefs and representations play a central role
in the development and sustenance of shared identities: Mos-
covici’s theory of social representations (Farr and Moscovici,
1984) provides an account of how shared visions can be per-
formed in practice, for example through group engagement
within a shared project (Bauer and Gaskell, 1999, 2008) such as
national grand challenges.
These theoretical concepts have been used to critique the
framing of national technological projects. The rhetoric of chal-
lenges encourages what van Loon (2002) calls a ‘politics of
urgency’; the rhetoric of being in a race (Kaldewey, 2018)
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legitimises sociotechnical solutions (Flink and Kaldewey, 2018),
so that technologies are offered as instrumental solutions to
identified societal problems (Savaget and Acero, 2017). The
desirability of the goals, such as improved safety or reduced
pollution, is appropriated by the solution, presenting itself as
logically necessary and inevitable. Framed thus, it might be
expected that social appraisal exercises such as parliamentary
inquiries risk seeking to justify proposed solutions, to perform a
normative democratic engagement (Stilgoe et al., 2014) and to
close rather than open debate (Stirling, 2008). In such a process,
commitment to the grand project tends to treat users as passive
subjects (Welsh and Wynne, 2013). Critics of such approaches to
technological progress argue for the public to be involved as
citizens integral to the co-production of sociotechnical systems
(Sovacool and Hess, 2017) within a framework of responsible
innovation (Stilgoe et al., 2013).
Visions of an AV future also position the public as a customer
exercising rational choices rather than as a citizen (Graf and
Sonnberger, 2019; Mladenović et al., 2020). This continues the way
the public are typically positioned in transport policy-making
(Bergman et al., 2017), and encourages the reasoning that public
rejection of the technology must be explained as based on
ignorance or upon irrational fears, whether in the case of AVs
(Graf and Sonnberger, 2019), or more generally (Sturgis and
Allum, 2004; Welsh and Wynne, 2013). Elite imaginaries pro-
moting technological solutions to social problems marginalise
public perspectives (Smallman, 2019). This can be seen in exam-
ples of public AV demonstrations and tests where it has been
argued that their performative purposes require so controlled an
environment that learning opportunities are limited, and failure
criteria are ill-defined or not defined at all (Engels et al., 2019).
When the public are framed as future customers, vision-
building seeks to recruit members of the public by selling the
benefits of the new technology. Pangbourne et al (2020) docu-
ment how visions of driverless ‘mobility as a service’ promise to
resolve the social dilemmas generated by aggregate individual
transport demand while ignoring the logic that continuing
commercial imperatives must perpetuate increasing aggregate
demand. Hildebrand (2019, p.158) shows how AV promotional
materials’ address the [technological] sublime and overcome its
dialectics in their visual rhetoric and myth-making’ by promising
just enough emancipation from the constraints of the existing
system without exposure to darker possibilities, presenting the
‘awe-inspiring’ but not the ‘awful’. Solving the problems of the
present, representations of the new and unfamiliar are thereby
anchored in understandings of the familiar—as described in
theories of social representations (Moscovici, 1984):
‘A vanguard vision is more likely to gain traction if it is tied
to entities and expectations familiar enough to provide an
intelligible guide to the imagined future’ (Hilgartner, 2015,
p. 40).
Across this range of related but distinct conceptual frameworks
that theorise sociotechnical change (Sovacool and Hess, 2017)
there are common themes around vision-building, the develop-
ment of representations of the technology, the existing society
within which it is to fit, and the future society it is intended to
build. The literature leads us to expect key stakeholders to build a
persuasive vision of AVs as a solution to national grand chal-
lenges, to mobilise resources. To examine a case of such vision-
building, we approached the analysis of a UK parliamentary
inquiry as an exploratory exercise, leaving open precisely how
such visions or representations should be conceptualised. After
reflecting upon implications of how the Inquiry was framed and
who contributed, we identify the main themes present in the
corpus and then ask the following questions:
RQ1. Which themes are more and less prevalent—overall, and
for different types of contributors?
RQ2. In the corpus, do we find the following elements, that our
literature review suggests are likely to be present in the building of
expectations or an imaginary:
RQ2a. The development of AVs being presented as a national
project?
RQ2b. Presentation of AV development as inevitable?
RQ2c. More emphasis or content on benefits than on risks?
RQ2d. Representations of the public as passive, and to be
persuaded?
Method
A case study. Following Sovacool and Hess (2017) we carry out a
content analysis of the material relating to a single case study.
Such an analysis can reveal the different expectations for the
technology expressed by participants in the Inquiry and can
address the question of whether the Inquiry process itself con-
tributes to building a particular representation of an AV future.
We have generated both a quantitative and a qualitative analysis
of the corpus material. The quantitative analysis is the primary
tool for answering RQ1. RQ2 is mostly addressed with qualitative,
interpretative analysis, illustrated with selected quotations from
the corpus, and with links drawn where relevant to the quanti-
tative results as well as to external sources.
We examine the case of ‘Driverless vehicles—where are we
going?’, a 2016 Inquiry by the House of Lords Science and
Technology Committee. It followed closely after an inquiry
carried out earlier by CCAV. UK parliamentary inquiries are
intended to inform Government strategy. Typically conducted to
analyse national crises, or to plan development (particularly for
transport), they are sometimes expected to fulfil a role of keeping
Government accountable. In practice the aims, and outcomes, of
inquiries are more complex, for example in sustaining the
authority of policy makers and their agendas (Rough, 2011). The
Inquiry was run by the staff to the committee, who advertised to
invite evidence, but also retained a list of likely key stakeholders
for any issue and contacted these specifically. Those contributing
written evidence include members of the public but most of the
852 authors of written evidence and 20 individual witnesses giving
oral evidence contributed because of their role as stakeholders,
many of them committed to the technology3.
Supplementary Table S1 lists the documents comprising the
corpus, from the formal call for evidence (September 2016)
through the evidence itself to the final report (March 2017) and
the Government response (October 2017). This information is
summarised in Table 2 at the start of our findings. The
documents are available on the Inquiry website4.
For the purpose of this analysis, each text unit is a paragraph,
and the distribution of units is shown across 14 different
categories of contributor in Table 2. Our analysis does not include
consideration of material on marine, agricultural and other ‘non-
road’ AVs: we focussed solely on the material directly related to
road vehicles, a total of 3350 out of the 4109 text units.
Analytic procedure. We use classical content analysis (CA) to
address the corpus. CA can code latent or manifest meanings; our
coding frame leans toward the latter as we intend our analysis to
be as transparent as possible without stating the obvious. How-
ever, we do go beyond simply counting instances of words or
phrases, instead classifying ‘words, sentences and larger text units
… as exemplars of predefined themes and valuations’ (Bauer,
2000, p. 134). We developed a coding frame initially based on an
open reading of the corpus. After several iterations we established
a reliable code book: intercoder reliability on documents coded
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independently was good, with Cohen’s Kappa co-efficient for a
sample of 61 text units calculated as 0.70. This is essentially a test
of agreement for all codes across these 61 units or 38435 possible
codings. Cohen’s Kappa is considered to correct too strongly for
chance agreement (Gwet, 2008; Wongpakaran et al., 2013) in
analyses such as ours, where most of the sampled units were not
marked by either coder as having most of the 3843 codes present;
Gwet’s AC1 coefficient (Riffe et al., 2019) was calculated as 0.92.
These steps taken to achieve a reliable coding scheme were
necessary to enable us to make claims about the nature of the
content in the corpus such as relative prevalence and co-
occurrence of themes (Krippendorff, 2004).
We next divided the corpus between the two coders separately
applying this coding frame. Coders first identified the presence or
absence of a broad theme, then the presence or absence of
particular subsidiary code (sub-code) themes. If the broad theme
was present but no sub-theme, a catch-all ‘unspecified’ sub-code
was applied. Two instances of this merit further comment: firstly,
‘economic models not specified’ included many references to the
topic of insurance as an allocation of costs and liabilities.
Secondly, ‘innovators not specified’ captures many references to
AV development organisations, and automotive companies, that
neither related to the three specified Innovator topics, nor
merited identification as a separate topic. The codebook of 64
codes and their presence across the corpus (108 documents and
3350 text units) is summarised in Table 1. The content analysis
was managed using the Nvivo software programme, and we
applied Nvivo’s analytical tools such as automatic word search
coding, co-occurrence analysis and basic descriptive statistical
analysis to aid the process of coding as well as analysing the
coding results and qualitatively interpreting the texts.
Findings
In this section we begin by setting our analysis in context,
reporting on how the Inquiry was formally framed and who its
contributors were. We then go on to report our content analysis,
first giving a quantitative overview of the prevalence and dis-
tribution of themes, and then offering a broadly qualitative and
more interpretative analysis, drawing links to further details of
our quantitative analysis, and to the broader literature where
relevant.
Framing. The original call for evidence provides a clear agenda:
‘The Government aims to ensure that the UK is a world
leader in developing, testing and deploying connected and
autonomous vehicles and, as set out above, has been
proactive in its response. This Inquiry will examine whether
the actions taken by the Government are appropriate,
considering both the scale of economic opportunity and the
potential public good benefits (House of Lords Science and
Technology Select Committee, 2016, p. 2)’.
While the Inquiry exercise provides the scope for competing
visions or expectations to be expressed, this framing presumes the
deployment of AVs to be desirable. Framed thus, the Inquiry
materials seem to reinforce the expectations or imaginary of AV
technology projected by the UK Government, as a response to the
‘grand challenge’ of future mobility. The call for evidence listed 18
questions which are provided as Supplementary Table S2.
Although these questions cover both potential benefits and
negative impacts of AV technology, many questions ask what is
needed to create an enabling environment for its introduction.
Most contributors broaden their responses to cover additional
issues they consider important, as they are invited to do in the call
for evidence.
The contributors. Supplementary Table S1 listing the documents
in the corpus identifies all of the contributors of written evidence.
Table 2 summarises the contributions, identifying the amount of
the corpus contributed by each.
The consultation process led to the inclusion of a particular set
of voices, establishing what and who this data can be said to
represent. This corpus also cannot be said to reflect all ‘AV
stakeholders’. For example, several of the commercial businesses
contributing are very small, while no major automotive
manufacturers contributed. Immediately prior to the Inquiry
period (September–December 2016) CCAV called for evidence
addressing the development of a testing ecosystem within the UK
(Centre for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles, 2017). Nine-
teen of the 53 contributors to this CCAV Inquiry were
commercial organisations, including General Motors, Nissan
and Jaguar Land Rover. Despite different Inquiry briefs, it seems
likely that some participants chose not to duplicate the process of
giving evidence.
A key feature of the corpus is that many contributors’ activities
concerning AVs are in some form funded by the Government.
These range from ministers from Government departments to
social science academics involved in human factors work or
critical responses drawing on work from science and technology
studies. 12 of the 85 contributors of written evidence are
representatives of Government departments or agencies. Of the
eight oral sessions, one is devoted to non-road AVs, and of the
remaining seven, witnesses in two (sessions 1 and 8) are
exclusively representatives of Government departments, in
another (session 5) the witnesses are two local government
representatives and in another (session 4) representatives from
local government or Government-funded AV trials.
To some extent therefore, the Inquiry records a conversation
between different branches of Government or entities otherwise
committed by the Government to the project of bringing AV
technology to the road. This is not unusual: Government’s efforts
flow through several different entities, including its own Innovate
UK agency which oversees the Transport Systems Catapult
(merged into the Connected Places Catapult in April 2019), as
well as the newly created CCAV, which itself has created a
separate offshoot, Zenzic, to manage AV testing. These entities
collaborate and provide research reports to each other (e.g. BSI
and Transport Systems Catapult, 2017; Transport Systems
Catapult, 2017). The Inquiry process itself is a dialogue between
the UK’s upper chamber and the Government. It is in effect a
closed collaboration, rather than an open public dialogue of the
kind realised in engagement activities (Stilgoe et al., 2014).
Prevalence and distribution of themes—quantitative analysis—
RQ1. Table 3 shows the concentration of the major themes, as
identified by the percentage of text units coded with the head-
codes, within each class of contributor. The reader should note
that because each text unit was a paragraph (usually a few sen-
tences), most text units covered several themes and thus had
more than one code applied to them—so percentage figures sum
to more than 100 across the rows.
Participant focus reflects the different roles: insurers focus on
economic models, which as noted earlier includes allocation of
costs and liabilities; consumer groups, charities and members of
the public emphasise the public as a topic, while Government
actors highlight the role of regulation and regulators. With
respect to our research questions, we make two initial observa-
tions: first, Government actors pay less attention to the public
than other participants do; second, against expectation, possible
risks feature in more of the corpus than possible gains: we discuss
this further below.
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Figure 1 7 shows the most prevalent detailed themes, as
identified by the subsidiary codes listed in Table 1. Many of the
dominant themes in Fig. 1—the three regulator themes (1, 2, 9),
economic benefits (4) and UK opportunities (6)—combine
together to represent the Governmental project of building an
AV future in the UK to deliver economic growth and progress.
Several topics, such as the question of liabilities and ethics (7),
data ownership (8) and digital (security) risks (13) are often, as
we discuss later, treated as challenges to be resolved to reach the
desired goal. Public goods (10) such as reduced congestion and
pollution, and safer roads (12) are both core expectations of the
beneficial outcomes of AVs as identified in the introduction. Two

































Insurance/legal 17 0 0 609 0 609 552
Academic researchers 17 3 3 630 107 737 489
Business/research 14 1 2 504 46 550 453
House of Lords N/A N/A N/A 0 355 229 584 442
Government 2 0 4 127 100 115 342 321
Trade associations 5 2 2 283 38 321 212
Local government 4 0 3 114 98 212 206
Charities 3 0 0 173 0 173 165
Gov’t non-departmental 5 1 2 172 58 230 153
Gov’t affiliated R&D 2 0 1 86 47 133 133
Policy experts 3 0 1 120 16 136 122
Consumer groups 3 0 1 55 18 73 71
Public 6 0 0 62 0 62 62
European Commission 0 0 1 0 41 41 41
Total 81 7 20 2935 455 813 4203 3422
Oral session units including 2 different speakers −94 −72
Total units used for subsequent % calculations 4109 3350
Table 3 Distribution of major themes (head codes) within categories of contributors.






























Insurance/legal 552 16 54 23 10 19 45 19 56 40
Academic Research 489 14 44 25 13 21 30 23 49 48
Business/research 453 13 48 27 24 42 44 43 48 41
House of Lords 442 13 40 41 26 36 53 36 64 36
HM Government 321 9 50 39 21 51 47 45 78 29
Trade Associaon 212 6 54 33 42 45 39 38 48 42
Local government 206 6 32 34 25 29 21 26 51 28
Charity 165 5 30 40 22 41 51 24 39 67
HMG non 
departmental 153 4 32 23 29 40 32 35 41 35 
HMG affiliated R&D 133 4 41 24 19 29 40 35 37 29
Policy Expert 122 4 38 35 23 46 44 16 19 60
Consumer Group 71 2 37 30 34 31 65 23 45 63
Public 62 2 15 32 13 39 35 10 15 56
European 
Commission 41 1 20 12 7 20 15 12 29 20 
Total Percent of 
corpus ( N=3,350) 100 44 30 21 34 42 30 51 41 
aPercentages are highlighted tonally, darker= higher.
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of the most prevalent themes are integral components of the
debate: AV drivers or riders (3) captures any reference to
members of the public as future users of AV technology, while
road safety risks (5) references possible new road safety risks
arising from the technology. Lastly, the topic of when AVs (11)
hints at the impatience of many participants, particularly
Governmental actors, for whom the question ‘when can we
expect AV technology on the roads?’ is pressing.
Figure 2 gives another more granular picture of how subsidiary
codes were distributed among contributors, focusing on the six
participant groups contributing the largest number of text units
(which represent 71% of the corpus). For simplicity of
presentation, rather than present one figure for each of the eight
head codes, we have grouped them into four: Fig. 2a represents
the role of innovators/innovation and the role of regulation/
regulators; Fig. 2b represents the public and the role of the public;
Fig. 2c represents possible gains from AVs and possible risks from
AVs; and Fig. 2d represents future expectations and infrastructure
as well as AV economic models. Each quarter of the figure relates
to groups of related codes, each bar represents a contributor
group. The blocks within the bars give the percentage of the
group’s text units that were coded with each of the subsidiary
codes. We included codes present in more than 5% of the group’s
text8, so for example, in Fig. 2d the absence of any of ‘The public’
subsidiary codes from the HMG column does not mean the
Government never mentions the public, just that codes related to
the public are not dominant themes in the Government material.
To maximise the legibility of the charts we use different ranges on
their vertical axes.
We noted that the Inquiry’s framing strongly influences the
content: within the ‘Regulators and Innovators’ codes the
prevalence of regulator roles as defining the legal framework
and facilitating technological progress reflects the purpose of the
Inquiry, to examine whether the Government was doing enough
in both of those areas. Alternative frames, such as the
Government controlling technology and commercial actors, or
prioritising a holistic vision of the transport system, are rarely
used. Within each of the Figure quadrant, we would highlight a
few key results.
In Figure 2a, the need to define legal frameworks (often
insurance regimes) to enable the technology, and the role of
regulators in driving technological progress, and (for Government
and business actors) economic activity, dominates. Regulators
‘representing the community’ or ‘protecting the public’ when
mentioned by Government entities are often limited to expecta-
tions of delivering safer roads with AV technology. Innovators
and the role of innovation receive little mention – the role of
innovation is not problematised by the Inquiry.
Figure 2b suggests that for the Inquiry the public’s role is to be
future AV drivers or riders, or to justify the need for AVs because of
the ‘public behaviour deficit’ of bad driving by existing road users.
Academic contributors—a heterogeneous group including both
technology academics and social scientists – and local Government
both consider the topic in the context of society as a whole: but the
most striking feature of the Figure is the lack of attention to the
public from the Government’s contribution to the Inquiry.
Figure 2c indicates that for the Government and House of
Lords, the AV future offers economic benefit and opportunity for
the UK; the risks comprise the question of attribution of
insurance liabilities as an issue to be resolved. Other actors
contribute to the building of expectations of an AV future by
rehearsing the public good benefits (see Introduction) and also
treating risks as issues to be resolved. Business contributors
emphasise the need not to be left behind.
Figure 2d aggregates three different major themes: economic
models, AV future expectations, and Infrastructure. Infrastruc-
ture receives limited attention in the Inquiry beyond debates over
what a road environment mixing conventional and automated
vehicles could or should look like. We suggest that this relative
lack of interest in practical (versus regulatory) and potentially
expensive Government action stems from the Inquiry’s focus on
vision-building ahead of any on-the-ground deployment. Local
government and business contributors both pay attention to


















Subsidiary code for theme
Fig. 1 Most prevalent detailed themes (subsidiary codes) observed for all contributors.
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legal contributors emphasise data ownership concerns. Assertions
that the AV future is desirable dominate.
Qualitative analysis
RQ2a: The National Project. The Government’s own principal
objective here is to facilitate, and participate in, technological
progress:
‘The Government is keen to ensure we make the most of
the opportunities they offer, and has established the Centre
for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CCAV) to keep
the UK at the forefront of the development and deployment
of this technology.’ (Government, 78, paragraph 29)
For other participants in the Inquiry, the imperative for
regulation to define the legal framework within which AVs are to
operate dominates, frequently because this is considered the first
issue on the critical path to facilitate progress. This is often linked
to providing the legal framework to manage liabilities, a focus of
the Government and insurance/legal contributors. Others focus
on cybersecurity (e.g. Orbit City Lab 3, Razorsecure 16) and data
ownership (e.g. Aviva 24, Deloitte 42, Information Commis-
sioner’s Office 61) as hurdles to overcome. Government also
emphasises opportunities for the UK economy and the role of
Government in facilitating economic activity. Commercial
(‘business/research’) and professional (‘insurance/legal’) partici-
pants frame risks as obstacles to be tackled in order to achieve the
objective of introducing the technology, not as reasons to reshape
the objective or to slow down progress. The engineering
consultant Atkins, a participant in some of the UK’s AV trials,
provides an example:
‘Transportation plays a critical role in society and as such
should be safe by design across the planning and execution
of new roads and railways […] a cyber secure framework
that puts transportation at its centre must be created and an
organisational culture change that creates defined cyber
security elements within its operations.’ (Atkins, 44,
paragraph 8)
Atkins also frames the data needs of AV technology as an
opportunity to achieve UK leadership:
‘The UK can be a world leader in establishing a market
focused independent data exchange role that allows for data
from all providers to be handled in an anonymous way that
drives value creation as well as network optimisation.’ (ibid
paragraph 8)
Few contributors challenge the Government to reflect on what
the objectives are beyond expediting the introduction of the
technology and achieving a leading role for the UK: exceptions
include two academic critiques from researchers drawing on
science and technology studies (Hopkins, 19, quoted later in this
article; Cohen and Cavoli, 65, referenced below).
The Government seeks to transform the present, defined by
‘Human error [as] a factor in up to 94% per cent of all recorded
road injury collisions in Great Britain’ (Government, 78, para 14):
‘Connected vehicles that can talk to each other, and to the
roadside infrastructure, are the future. We want the UK to
embrace these technologies which will transform our roads
and open up a brand new route for global investment. The
potential for transformation is significant, and vehicle to
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Fig. 2 Most mentioned detailed themes (subsidiary codes) for top 6 classes of contributor.
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enable safer road conditions for users.’ (Government, 88,
paragraph 7)
The Government also seeks wider benefits than safer roads
and opportunities to attract inward investment such as
‘productivity, efficiency and accessibility’ (Government, 98,
paragraph 23).
These abstract policy goals echo the list drawn from earlier
Government statements (see Introduction). The promotion of the
technology, and its entrenchment in UK Industrial Strategy (HM
Government, 2017), is therefore unsurprising; what is noticeable
within the Inquiry corpus is how others share the task of building
and corroborating this vision. Fifteen pieces of written evidence
refer to the majority of collisions being at least partially
attributable to human error, usually stating 94% or a similar
figure, with several referencing the Government’s 2015 pathway
document for this (Department for Transport, 2015b). This is
often treated as a case for AVs, and Jasanoff and Kim (2009)
argue that such repetitions contribute to establishing the
discursive frames that are then filtered into the dominant targets
for policy. But as Cohen and Cavoli point out in their literature
review (Cohen et al., 2017) and in their written evidence, the
logical step from ‘human error [partly] responsible for over 94%
of crashes’ to ‘removing human drivers will greatly improve
safety’ obscures the complexities of moving from the present road
environment to a distant future without human drivers.
Many contributors of written evidence anticipate the same
benefits from AV technology besides safety: economic efficiencies
through fuel savings, release of driving time for productive
activity and improved logistics as well as public goods such as
wider access to mobility and reduced congestion and emissions.
Emphasising the opportunities, eight describe them as ‘transfor-
m[ative]’ and ten as ‘huge’ or ‘enormous’.
In the oral evidence, demand and supply sides of this
imaginary are personified by the Government’s two witnesses.
The Minister for Transport’s opening statement describes the
Government’s job as providing the regulatory framework to
ensure that a self-interested private sector delivers to society the
many benefits the technology offers, and plans for their impact
upon society. Alongside him, the Minister for Business, Energy
and Industrial Strategy sees the task as ensuring that that
private sector treats the UK as a ‘go-to destination’, positioning
AVs within an industrial strategy aimed at ‘tackling the
imbalances of prosperity and productivity across the country’
(96, Q63). The hope expressed is that the technology provides a
catalyst for re-engineering society. The UK Atomic Energy
Authority also hopes for a social transformation on the labour
supply side:
‘This is potentially an opportunity to ‘rebalance the
economy’ if we can encourage more of our talent to focus
on STEM subjects. We need to imagine a society in which
digital professionals are the highest paid and the most
valued by society as a whole.’ (30, p. 3)
At the same time, SmarterUK, a trade representative body for
the technology sector, imagines a social transformation on the
demand side:
‘The deployment of autonomous vehicles will lead to shift
in how we view public and private transport. Not only will
it enable greater mobility for those groups within society
who currently have limited options; such as children, the
elderly, and the disabled, increasing the welfare of these
demographics; but it will also lead to a shift in business and
delivery models, with citizens, particularly in urban areas,
moving towards ownership models driven by the sharing
economy.’ (82, p. 1)
RQ2b: A desirable, inevitable future, and RQ2c: the balance of
benefits and risks. This is not to say that participants in the
Inquiry don’t see risks. Table 3 shows a greater weight of content
dealing with risks than benefits of the technology. But risks are
framed as issues to be addressed rather than challenges to the
imaginary. Only 10% of the corpus addresses whether AVs
should happen. But most of this content implies that AVs are
highly desirable (5%) or inevitable (3%) while only 2% suggests
that the desirability of AVs might be contestable. In only 1% did
we find suggestions that the technology might be over-hyped.
Engineering consultancy Atkins exemplifies how the desirability
and necessity of pursuing an AV future is taken for granted:
‘It is increasingly important that the UK leads the charge in
demonstrating its capabilities in a growing and nationally
important market that will facilitate productivity and
maintain the attractiveness and competitiveness of Britain’s
economy’. (Atkins, 44, paragraph 10)
Specialist witnesses are sought by the Committee to explain
how they see the technology evolving, so there are frequent
statements that take for granted the emergence of the technology:
‘In one hundred years time we will be using autonomous
vehicles. It seems unimaginable that we will not have the
computers, sensor and software to solve the remaining
challenges. We can see an end state.’ (UK Atomic Energy
Authority, 30, p. 1)
Instead of the question of whether, or how, the technology
might be desirable, Government participants and the Lords
concentrate on timescales, the question of ‘how soon?’ Timescale
is discussed in 12% of the corpus: grand challenges are often
perceived as a race (Kaldewey, 2018) and there is a fear of being
left behind (Fig. 2b).
The 2% of content challenging this future consists of 80 text
units: 9 of these are posed in two written submissions that draw
on science and technology studies perspectives, 16 are from
members of the public, and 15 from a policy expert critiquing
the logic of the safety argument. However, these views
do gain the Committee’s attention: 15 more of the references
are to be found in the oral sessions, with a further 6 in their
final report. The final report contains fewer assertions of the
desirability of the technology than flagging of issues, emphasis-
ing two particular concerns: first, problems associated with
Level 3 autonomy, especially the likely dangers of over-trust
in the technology; second, ‘The eradication, or near eradication,
of human error will only be realised with full automation.
CAV are not the only way to reduce road casualties. There are
other means by which to achieve this and we urge the
Government not to lose sight of these other possibilities.’ (97,
paragraph 87)
Committee member Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield, self-
described ‘sceptic’, worries that the selectivity of the Inquiry
process determines the nature of the vision it builds:
‘…it seems to me that the possibility of having mixed
fleets of non-, highly, and fully automated vehicles all
operating at the same time raises the possibility of chaos
on a truly heroic scale. I wonder if your modelling will
look at the worst cases, because there is a danger […] by
the very nature of this Inquiry, that we will attract as
witnesses evangelists for the future, which we are all very
keen on but you can be slightly gung-ho. There is a slight
sound of the tambourine being rattled sometimes.’
(93, Q45)
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R2d Modelling the public. We noted above the repetition of the
argument for AVs based on the deficiencies of human driving.
Contributors also tend to find the public at fault for their
responses to driverless vehicles, either as ignorant of their bene-
fits, thus deficient in knowledge, or as deficient in attitude in their
resistance to new technology. Insurer Ageas captures both:
‘The public need to be educated on the different types of
autonomous vehicles and the benefits of using them. Large
scale trials, such as Volvo’s Drive Me London scheme, are
likely to prove critical in explaining to the man in the street
what autonomous cars are likely be capable of, where they
will operate, and what the individual and societal benefits
are. We envisage that increasing understanding will lead to
more favourable attitudes towards autonomous vehicles
and drive up their adoption.’ (39, paragraph 4.1)
Several contributors point out that the public have little
exposure to the technology, which encouraged the head of CCAV
to set aside public concerns in his oral evidence:
‘You have to take all these surveys with a little pinch of salt.
That famous saying by Henry Ford: if he had asked what
people wanted they would have said a faster horse10. People
have not yet properly interacted with this technology.’
(89, Q5)
Although there are frequent (186) references to the public
being consulted or involved in demonstration projects, this is
often to increase public acceptance, not to help to shape the
vision:
‘Therefore, we see research exploring how potential
customers will interact with this new technology as essential
to achieving acceptance.’ (Transport for Greater Manche-
ster, 25, p. 2)
This is coherent with the perceived imperative of introducing
the technology. However, it reinforces the founding premise (of
driver error) that the public is a problem. Likewise instead of
engaging with the possibility that Level 3 automation, where the
driver has to remain ready to resume control, may be intrinsically
too dangerous, contributors often locate the problem not with the
system but with the driver, who will need to be educated about
the capabilities of different systems, e.g.:
‘..public education and awareness raising initiatives will be
needed to help drivers understand the distinction between
the different levels of autonomous technology. A crucial
message is that until truly fully autonomous vehicles are
available, the driver must be fully alert and ready to assume
control at all times, and is legally responsible for any
accidents that occur.’ (RoSPA, 23 paragraph 19)
Systems-based human factors work (e.g. Bainbridge, 1983;
Leveson, 2011) argues that failure is located in the complete
system, not simply the operator: Level 3 AVs are frequently
criticised as unsafe systems (for the public debate, see Solon,
2018). If Level 5 automation becomes commonplace, actors used
to seeing the public as problematic may readily consider them to
be obstructive: although detailed implementation of this further
future receives less attention in the corpus, some written
contributors (e.g. Deloitte, 42; Ageas, 39; SmarterUK, 82)
anticipate geofencing or other forms of restriction on human
drivers on the road network, while others such as the Motorcycle
Action Group (68) worry about the exclusion of some road users
from AV domains just as the conventional car drove pedestrians
from parts of the road network (Norton, 2008).
We comment further on two salient aspects that emerge across
the answers to our research questions: first, how obstacles to an
AV future are treated, with specific reference to the Inquiry
report, and second the concern over regulation stifling
innovation.
Obstacles to an AV future, as identified in the Inquiry report. Our
quantitative analysis justifies the conclusion that the over-
whelming weight of the corpus serves to build the vision of an
inevitable, desirable AV future that will itself contribute to
building a better, more prosperous UK society. But the Lords do
heed concerns raised in the Inquiry. For example they
acknowledge the problems with transfers of control in Level 3
vehicles (97, p. 35f) and issues associated with a mixed fleet (97,
p. 36f). They flag these as needing further research. Other
concerns, such as the difficulty of attributing liability (97, p. 22f)
for insurance purposes, or the lack of technical skills in the UK
are treated as threshold issues to be resolved by Government
action. Similarly, the risks that a system embedded in the ori-
ginal system of automobility and framed by commercial pres-
sures may struggle to improve accessibility (97, p. 26f) or
congestion (p. 29f) are raised, but there are no suggestions for
their mitigation beyond a generic call for the ‘right policy
decisions’ (p. 30). This underplays the likelihood that the wrong
policy decisions may achieve the opposite of these intended
benefits (Cohen and Cavoli, 2019).
On the subject of the economic costs and benefits
of UK investment in AVs, the report argues that ‘There is little
hard evidence’ (p. 32) and calls for more analysis before
concluding:
‘Nonetheless, the UK’s ambition should be to take the lead
with CAV in areas where a business case can be made
which shows a clear early advantage accruing to the UK’
(p. 32)
For its part the Government responds to the Lords’
recommendations by echoing and welcoming every acknowl-
edgement of further opportunity while arguing that it is already
taking action to address concerns with further research, support
for private sector initiatives, or participation in international
standard setting. Its response opens by restating the vision that
guides its policy:
‘The UK has the potential to be a global leader in the
development and deployment of automated technologies,
building on our heritage as a nation of innovators and
entrepreneurs and utilising our existing centres of excel-
lence across numerous sectors’ (98, p. 1)
The Inquiry highlights the supply side challenge of skills
shortages. Paul Newman, founder of Oxbotica, a key participant
in the CCAV funded trials, is emphatic:
‘I cannot overstate the importance of this: we need about
10,000 more engineers a year. We need to plough money
into universities to teach information engineering, data
engineering and software.’ (38, paragraph 16)
The Government responds by claiming ‘the UK’s supply of
specialist skills scores well above the EU average’ (p. 4). As with
other challenges, a serious issue that suggests Government
ambitions might be unrealistic is set aside, and we noted earlier
how one contributor reframed this risk as an opportunity to
increase the UK’s engineering skills.
Reluctance to regulate too soon. Throughout, we observe an
aspiration for leadership and the consequent language of a race,
in which hesitation risks ceding advantage. This encourages a
particular response to the uncertainties inherent in the emergence
of the technology:
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‘At this time the UK must be careful not to move too
quickly to introduce legal or legislative requirements on an
industry and sector that is very nascent and developing.’
(SmarterUK, 82, paragraph 15.4)
The Government emphasises that it takes safety seriously, but
treats other issues as too uncertain to warrant intervention:
‘Government recognises that it has a role to play in
managing and mitigating any risks that might arise and the
importance of striking a balance within the regulatory
framework to ensure that laws are in place to prevent harm
to humans, while at the same time ensuring that innovation
is not stifled and any barriers to the development of
these technologies are removed where possible.’ (98,
paragraph 32)
That this balance is difficult to strike is unavoidable
(Collingridge, 1980). The Government’s commitment to the
supply side and modernising vision for the economy favours a
relatively laissez-faire approach. A corollary is to build an
optimistic demand side of the imaginary, as one of the Inquiry’s
own witnesses observes:
‘the representation of economic and social benefits in
government documents is overly positive and does not
reflect the very large uncertainties about many of the
potential effects of the widespread adoption of CAV
technologies in transport.’ (Hopkins, 19, p. 1)
Findings summary. We have shown how the Inquiry material is
dominated by voices committed to the building of an AV future
(RQ1), endorsing this future as an urgent national project and
addressing questions of how to achieve this future (RQ2a). We
argue that the effect is to close down debate over the desirability
of AV technology as the best solution to a range of societal
challenges, presenting this future as inevitable (RQ2b). Benefits
are taken for granted while risks become issues to overcome
(RQ2c). Dissenting voices are in the minority and are under-
represented in the Inquiry’s overall conclusions. The public are
often viewed less as passive agents and more as a hurdle to be
overcome, with references to their behaviour deficits as bad dri-
vers, their knowledge deficits in not understanding the technol-
ogy, and, to the extent they express scepticism, their attitude
deficit (RQ2d).
Discussion
The AV project in the UK. We have treated this House of Lords
Inquiry as an exemplar of a number of phenomena proposed by
the science and technology studies literature. Following Sovacool
and Hess, we have tried to avoid a strict adherence to any one
theory of sociotechnical change, emphasising instead the central
idea that powerful actors seek to build dominant representations
of technological futures, and that these representations can
become entrenched, mandating the technological solutions pre-
ferred by the authors of those representations. Within the vision
of an AV future presented in this Inquiry, we found a number of
features proposed by diverse theories, such as the construction of
the sociotechnical imaginary as a national project, and the
urgency conveyed upon AV technology by framing it as a solu-
tion to a Government-defined grand challenge.
Some of our findings corroborate existing research on UK
efforts to develop AV technology: the sense of an urgent race
(Hopkins and Schwanen, 2018), and the opportunity to re-
establish economic strength (Mladenović et al. 2020). In addition,
both Hildebrand (2019) and Pangbourne et al. (2020) observe
how representations of AV futures present unbalanced analyses of
risks and benefits. In this Inquiry, we found more mentions of
risks than of benefits, but the risks were typically framed in a
positive light, as challenges to address and overcome. Some of the
risks are the domains of governance identified in Mladenović
et al.’s (2020) analysis of the UK AV imaginary: as we found,
substantial issues such as the difficulty of establishing an effective
insurance regime or managing cybersecurity risks do not call into
question the commitment to AV technology, but are rather
challenges to the regulatory facilitation of the technology.
Hopkins notes a further imbalance in written evidence to the
Inquiry:
‘Anticipated economic benefits such as employment
growth, productivity increases, inward investments and
GDP growth as well as reductions in road congestion are
given greater attention than other grand challenges UK
transport and society more generally face—i.e., the need to
increase physical activity, improve air quality and reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, and concerns over social
inequality.’ (19, p. 1)
We argue that this criticism is borne out by the Inquiry
material with its predominant focus upon how to achieve UK
participation in the supply-side of an AV future. The beneficial
outcome of achieving ‘the other grand challenges’ is taken for
granted. Progress towards many of these anticipated benefits
could actually be made without investment in automation.
Targeted public investment in public transportation is key to
increased accessibility and to address social inequalities (Di
Ciommo and Shiftan, 2017) and improve sustainability (McLeod
et al., 2017). Such public goods require Government intervention,
in particular to manage the balance between private and public
transportation (see Cohen and Cavoli, 2019). As Pangbourne
et al. (2020) note, the commercial imperatives of new mobility
solutions may well increase travel and actually worsen transport’s
negative externalities. The Inquiry report does note the need for
‘the right policy decisions’ regarding such public goods, but puts
greater emphasis on regulatory steps to facilitate AV technology
in the UK in pursuit of the economic opportunity. We think it
reasonable to question whether automation per se will deliver
policy interventions lacking in the past. Currie (2018) protests
forcefully that the rhetoric extolling the sharing economy
associated with visions of an AV future tends to forget that we
can achieve the same benefits from the existing shared economy
of public transportation.
Hildebrand (2019) reveals how AV promotion focuses on
positive corporate visions of what she calls the technological
sublime: some of the Inquiry’s contributors go much further,
imagining not just the emancipation of individual travellers but a
wholesale re-engineering of society, ‘rebalancing the economy’
and ‘[shifting] how we view public and private transport’,
whereby the technological solution delivers the aspirations of the
grand challenges.
The Inquiry and the Public. The Inquiry seeks to achieve a social
appraisal of technology. There have been many calls to open up
and democratise sociotechnical change generally (Stilgoe et al.
2013; Stirling, 2008) as well as in relation to new mobility
technology:
“there is a need to engage transparently all relevant societal
constituencies in critical conversations and decision-
making about [traffic control] technology development”
(Mladenovic and McPherson, 2016, p. 1145).
The Inquiry frequently mentions public consultation, but the
corpus itself sees little representation of public views. The science
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and technology studies literature has problematised the public
deliberation it has called for (Irwin, 2006). We noted earlier the
risk that public inquiries can become performances to legitimate
the sociotechnical project that powerful actors are pursuing. The
remit of the Inquiry, the nature of its contributors, and its
restricted focus on how to achieve an AV future as the already
chosen solution to broader mobility challenges all deliver such a
performance. As one member of the Lords notes, the result is a
rather un-self-critical recitation of the desirability of the AV
future, which he likened to the rattling of tambourines by cult
members.
Conventional vehicles and AVs both have many publics:
people can be pedestrians or drivers, accident victims or
consumers. Graf and Sonnberger (2019) and Mladenović et al.
(2020) both argue that in representations of an AV future the
public are construed as users rather than citizen co-producers of
that future. But the marginalisation of the public from a
constructive role starts much earlier. The foundational premise
for promoting AVs, rehearsed many times in the Inquiry, is road
safety, a frame in which the public are either passive victims or
dangerous drivers. The automotive industry has long laid the
blame for accidents firmly upon fallible human drivers (Nader,
1973), just as the human operator tends to be blamed when any
automated system fails (Leveson, 2011). The foundational
hostility to the driver is just one example of the way the evidence
in the Lords Inquiry frequently paints the public as deficient:
deficient as bad drivers generally, or potentially as drivers
impeding CAVs, deficient as consumers ignorant of the benefits
of the new technology, sometimes deficient in having Luddite
fears of the new technology. This does not form the basis for an
effective co-production between competing interest groups of the
technology as it emerges. Instead, a vision structured by supply-
side aspirations chooses to let the technology determine the
future social shape of transportation, denying public agency in
shaping future mobility (see Jasanoff, 2015 on imaginaries and
agency). Rather than opening up the project to debate, the
Inquiry is itself a part of the project, marginalising dissent and
alternative visions. However, the practicalities of integrating AVs
with other road users even in restricted spaces may demand the
involvement, and cooperation, of the public, creating opportu-
nities for a more substantive role for public engagement.
Conclusion
We argue that the case study of the Lords’ AV Inquiry exhibits
many of the features attributed to representations of socio-
technical futures by the science and technology studies literature.
The Inquiry process itself manifests the collaboration between
heterogeneous actors to build a representation of the future
framed as a national project, presenting it as desirable and
inevitable. Posed as a technological solution to grand challenges,
delivering an AV future in which the UK is an active participant
becomes an end in itself rather than just an instrument to achieve
the policy objectives expressed in the challenges. The Inquiry
reinforces the Governmental prioritisation of UK participation in
the supply side of the AV future. The demand-side of the future
receives less attention, with the public construed as future users
whose concerns are set aside for the moment. The Inquiry fre-
quently represents the public as deficient, whether as bad drivers,
as unfamiliar with the technology or as misguided in their fears of
this future. We argue that construing the public as deficient
encourages their exclusion from shaping future mobility systems.
The genuine engagement many call for to address societal grand
challenges requires greater confidence in the constructive role the
public can play.
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Notes
1 Except where specifically identified we will treat the terms Connected and
Autonomous Vehicle, Autonomous Vehicle, Automated Vehicle and Driverless Car as
interchangeable. This is a simplification; debate continues over what ‘AVs’ should be
called (Shladover, 2017).
2 Written submissions were made by 85 contributors and 3 made supplementary
submissions, totalling 88 written submissions.
3 Brief information on the conduct of the committee is described on p16 of the final
report (House of Lords Science and Technology Select Committee, 2017). We
confirmed details in correspondence with the Clerk to the Committee, Anna Murphy.
4 At 30 January 2020, http://www.parliament.uk/autonomous-vehicles
5 The codebook comprises 64 codes. One code was added after assessing intercoder
reliability.
6 HMG refers to ‘Her Majesty’s Government’. Government refers to Ministers or civil
servants working directly within ministerial departments. HMG non-departmental
refers to government executive entities such as the Meteorological Office. HMG
Affiliated R&D refers to research organisations which are closely affiliated to
government, in contrast to those based within academic institutions or commercial
organisations such as management consultancies.
7 Supplementary table S3 provides the full version of the information presented in Figs.
1 and 2, including head codes, sub-head codes and individual specific codes.
8 We explained above the generation of the catch-all ‘unspecified’ subcodes within each
major theme. These are excluded from the analysis in Fig. 2 because they cover a
number of ideas and their consequent heterogeneity makes them less informative. For
example, ‘public unspecified’ includes references to the public as employees and also as
accident victims.
9 References to documents in the corpus are given as: abbreviated name of the witness,
‘AUV’ document number as listed in Supplementary Table S1, and a paragraph or
page reference. In the case of the oral evidence sessions the reference is to the question
number. Documents available, as at 30 January 2020, at http://www.parliament.uk/
autonomous-vehicles
10 The attribution of this quote is apocryphal (Vlaskovits, 2011).
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